The Secret Agreement That Ended The Cuban Missile Crisis Included Brainly

Castro and Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev agreed to place secret strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba if the United States invaded. Like Castro, Khrushchev thought the United States would soon invade Cuba. If Cuba ceased to be a communist country, it would damage Khrushchev`s reputation around the world, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront Americans « with more than words. the logical answer was missiles. » [7] Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had bet on sending the missiles to Cuba with the specific aim of increasing his country`s nuclear strike force. The Soviets have long felt uncomfortable with the number of nuclear weapons being fired at them by sites in Western Europe and Turkey, and they have seen the deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to improve the conditions of competition. Another key factor in the Soviet missile plan was the hostile relationship between the United States and Cuba. The Kennedy administration had already launched an attack on the island — the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 — and Castro and Khrushchev saw missiles as a way to deter further U.S. aggression. An international diplomatic crisis erupted in May 1960, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) shot down an American U-2 spy plane in Soviet airspace and captured its pilot Francis Gary Powers (1929-1977).

Faced with evidence of spying on his nation, … Mikojan, whose wife was seriously ill, accepted the mission knowing that the future of relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union was at stake. Shortly after arriving in Cuba, Mikoyan received the news that his wife had died, but he still promised to stay in Cuba and conclude negotiations with Castro. The Popular American media, especially television, have often used the events of the Missile Crisis and forms that are both fictional and documentary. [161] Jim Willis counts the crisis among the 100 « media moments that changed America. » [162] Sheldon Stern finds that half a century later, there are still many « misunderstandings, half-truths, and open lies » that have marked media versions of what happened during those two upsetting weeks in the White House. [163] EXCOMM then discussed the impact on the strategic balance of power, both politically and militarily. The joint staff chiefs thought the missiles would seriously change the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. An additional 40, he argued, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance sheet. The United States already had about 5,000 strategic warheads, [55]:261, but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara concluded that at 340, the Soviets would not significantly alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he repeated that « it made no difference. The military balance has not been altered.

I didn`t believe it then, and I don`t believe it now. [56] The Cuban Crisis, also known as the October Crisis of 1962 (Spanish: October Crisis), the Caribbean Crisis (Russian: Карибский кризис, tr. Karibsky krizis, IAP: [kɐˈrjipskjjɪj ˈkrjizjɪs]) or the fear of missiles, was a month, 4 days (October 16 – November 20, 1962) the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, triggered by the deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. The confrontation is often seen as the next one that degenerated the Cold War into a global nuclear war. [2] The United States had sent U-2 surveillance over Cuba since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. [38] The first problem that led to a pause in reconnaissance flights occurred on August 30, when a U-2 of the U.S. Air Force`s Strategic Air Command accidentally flew over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East. . .

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